India–Bangladesh Border Fencing and the West Bengal Question Explained
India shares a long and complex land border with Bangladesh, stretching across multiple states in eastern and northeastern India. This border plays a critical role in national security, migration control, and cross-border crime prevention. Over the years, the Union government has pursued an extensive border fencing programme along the India–Bangladesh boundary. However, a significant portion of this border remains unfenced, with West Bengal emerging as a focal point in the political and administrative debate surrounding the delays.
According to an official reply given in the Lok Sabha by the Ministry of Home Affairs in February 2025, the total length of the India–Bangladesh land border is 4,096.70 kilometres. Five states share this border, namely West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram. Among them, West Bengal alone accounts for 2,216.7 kilometres, which is more than half of the entire border length. This geographical reality makes West Bengal central to any discussion on border fencing progress.
The same parliamentary reply confirmed that around 864.48 kilometres of the India–Bangladesh border is still not fenced. Of this, about 174.51 kilometres has been categorised as “non-feasible,” meaning fencing is considered impractical due to terrain and environmental conditions. The government cited marshlands, riverine stretches, landslide-prone areas, objections from Bangladesh’s Border Guard, limited construction seasons, and delays in land acquisition as the main reasons for incomplete fencing.
While border security itself is a Union government responsibility, the fencing of borders is not purely a security operation. It also involves civil administration, land ownership, and local governance. Land acquisition is constitutionally a State subject, which means the identification, acquisition, and transfer of land for fencing must be carried out by state governments through district administrations. Without possession of land, even centrally funded and centrally planned fencing projects cannot move forward.
This is where the Centre–State friction arises. Recently, Union Home Minister Amit Shah publicly blamed the West Bengal government for delaying border fencing by not cooperating in land acquisition and administrative clearances. He alleged that resistance at the state and local levels had slowed down fencing work in several stretches of the border. The West Bengal government, in turn, has countered that border management is the Centre’s responsibility and that the Border Security Force operates under Union control.
Constitutionally, both sides are partly correct. Border guarding and deployment of forces like the BSF fall entirely under the Union List. However, land, law and order, and local administration fall under the State List. The Centre cannot unilaterally acquire land or bypass state machinery under normal conditions. Passing a central law to convert land acquisition for border fencing into a Union subject would require a constitutional amendment, which needs wide political consensus and ratification by states. This is why the Centre relies on coordination rather than coercion.
The West Bengal–Bangladesh border also presents unique challenges. Many villages are located extremely close to the international boundary. In some cases, fencing separates homes from farmlands, affecting livelihoods. There are also densely populated areas, informal cross-border economic activity, and riverine borders that shift with time. These factors make fencing politically sensitive and administratively complex.
In practical terms, the absence of fencing does not mean the absence of security. The BSF continues to patrol unfenced stretches using surveillance, checkpoints, and coordinated operations. However, fencing is seen as a force multiplier that reduces infiltration, smuggling, and illegal movement, which is why delays attract strong political attention.
The ongoing debate highlights a broader issue in Indian federalism. National security objectives often depend on state-level cooperation for execution. When political relations between the Centre and a state government are strained, infrastructure projects linked to security can become flashpoints. The India–Bangladesh border fencing issue in West Bengal is a clear example of how constitutional division of powers shapes real-world outcomes.
In conclusion, the delay in fencing the India–Bangladesh border is not the result of a single authority failing, but a combination of geography, federal structure, diplomacy, and politics. Understanding this distinction is essential to separate security concerns from political rhetoric.
