What the Bangladesh Turmoil Means for India’s Eastern Security
India is watching Bangladesh’s political upheaval not as a distant democracy debate but as a direct challenge to its eastern security calculus. What makes the current churn especially concerning for New Delhi is not just internal political instability, but the visible role of external actors, explicit diplomatic signalling, and the sidelining of a long-standing governing party in ways that contradict the very democratic principles being invoked.
Bangladesh’s strategic importance to India’s eastern flank is foundational. Its geography envelopes much of India’s Northeast, making cooperation on border management, counter-insurgency, and intelligence sharing indispensable. For over a decade, relative calm in the Northeast has been sustained not only by Indian security measures but by firm cooperation from Dhaka. Any dilution of that cooperation immediately translates into heightened risk for India.
A key reason for this stability was India’s working relationship with Sheikh Hasina. Her government took decisive action against Indian insurgent groups operating from Bangladeshi soil, dismantled logistical networks, and institutionalised intelligence cooperation. For India, this was not ideological alignment but strategic reliability. That is why allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency and sections of the US diplomatic establishment played a role in engineering pressure that contributed to Hasina’s political marginalisation are taken seriously in New Delhi. The concern is not whether protests were organic or orchestrated, but whether sustained external pressure helped reshape Bangladesh’s political trajectory.
The effective exclusion of the Awami League from contesting elections deepens this concern. From a policy perspective, removing a dominant, mass-based party through administrative or judicial means rather than electoral defeat undermines political legitimacy. For India, this exclusion cannot be separated from the broader context of diplomatic pressure, visa restrictions, sanctions threats, and persistent messaging from Washington on political outcomes. The perception in New Delhi is that democracy rhetoric was used selectively, with little regard for the destabilising consequences of sidelining a party that anchored state authority.
Political vacuums rarely remain neutral. The space created by the weakening of the Awami League has raised alarms about the re-legitimisation of Islamist actors, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami. This concern intensified after the leaked audio of a US diplomat openly discussing engagement with JeI, downplaying its ideological record, and signalling a willingness to “work with” the group. For Indian policymakers, this was not a casual remark but a strategic signal. JeI’s historical opposition to Bangladesh’s independence, its alignment with Islamist narratives hostile to India, and its long-standing ideological proximity to Pakistan make any external encouragement of its political relevance deeply unsettling.
This brings Pakistan’s role back into focus. India’s security establishment has consistently assessed that Islamist networks in Bangladesh have served as conduits for Pakistan’s regional influence, particularly in narrative warfare and ideological mobilisation targeting India’s Northeast. When a US diplomat appears to normalise engagement with such actors while a pro-India governing party is pushed out of the electoral arena, New Delhi sees a dangerous contradiction. The fear is not immediate hostility, but the gradual erosion of Bangladesh’s firm stance against anti-India activities.
India is equally uneasy about the precedent this sets. Allegations of CIA-linked pressure, diplomatic signalling, and selective engagement suggest a form of political engineering rather than institution-building. New Delhi has long opposed such approaches, not just in Bangladesh but globally, because they weaken state capacity and invite long-term instability. For India, externally shaped political outcomes in neighbouring states are red lines, regardless of how attractively they are framed.
The fallout extends beyond security into economics and connectivity. Bangladesh is central to India’s Act East policy, providing transit routes, port access, energy cooperation, and regional integration. Political uncertainty undermines infrastructure planning, delays projects, and weakens India’s strategic reach into Southeast Asia. Stability in Dhaka is not a diplomatic preference for India; it is an economic and strategic necessity.
From a policy standpoint, India’s position is pragmatic and consistent. It prefers neighbours that are stable, sovereign, and internally coherent. What it fears are fractured political systems vulnerable to ideological radicalisation and external leverage. The sidelining of the Awami League, combined with overt diplomatic engagement with JeI and allegations of US intelligence pressure, signals a troubling shift away from stability toward managed uncertainty.
For India, this episode is not about defending Sheikh Hasina or her party. It is about recognising how selective democracy promotion and political exclusion weaken neighbouring states and create security vacuums. Bangladesh’s internal consensus has been a cornerstone of India’s eastern security. Undermining it carries consequences that will be felt far beyond Dhaka, and New Delhi is preparing for that reality with quiet but growing concern.
