Revamping Judicial Appointments: Can Democracy and Independence Coexist?
A fresh storm has erupted over judicial appointments in India. Justice Vipul Pancholi’s proposed elevation to the Supreme Court has triggered dissent within the Collegium itself. Justice B.V. Nagarathna, in a rare move, openly opposed the recommendation, warning it was “counter-productive to the administration of justice” and risked damaging whatever credibility the Collegium system still holds. Pancholi’s case is controversial because he ranks only 57th in all-India seniority, yet was chosen over more senior judges. His appointment would also give Gujarat High Court three sitting judges on the Supreme Court bench, raising concerns about regional imbalance. Added to this is the opacity around his transfer from Gujarat to Patna High Court, a process Justice Nagarathna suggested should be revisited.
This controversy has been compounded by questions about gender representation. Several senior women judges were overlooked in favor of Pancholi, prompting prominent voices such as Indira Jaising to call out the Collegium for ignoring diversity at the top bench. The issue is even sharper since Justice Nagarathna is now the only woman judge in the Supreme Court following Justice Bela Trivedi’s retirement. In parallel, another Collegium recommendation has stirred debate: the inclusion of Raj Damodar Wakode, nephew of Chief Justice of India Bhushan R. Gavai, among names for the Bombay High Court. Though the CJI reportedly recused himself, the recommendation reignited long-standing concerns about nepotism and the so-called “uncle-judge syndrome.” These flashpoints underscore deep public skepticism and revive the central question—how can India reform judicial appointments to ensure accountability and transparency without compromising independence?
The collegium system, established through judicial interpretations, gives primacy to senior Supreme Court judges in recommending appointments to the higher judiciary. While it was designed to protect judicial independence from executive interference, it has faced severe criticism over the years. Critics argue that it is opaque, unaccountable, and slow, with recommendations often delayed or stalled due to friction with the executive. The lack of clear criteria for elevation and transfer fuels perceptions of favoritism and undermines public confidence.
At the heart of the debate is a constitutional dilemma. Judicial independence, safeguarded by the Supreme Court through the basic structure doctrine, is essential for a functioning democracy. Yet, democratic accountability requires that appointments not be confined to an exclusive circle of judges. The executive and legislature argue for a role in ensuring representation and transparency. However, political interference carries its own risks—bias, erosion of impartiality, and the weakening of separation of powers. Balancing these competing needs is India’s greatest challenge.
Other democracies offer lessons. In the United Kingdom, an independent Judicial Appointments Commission operates with transparency and broad stakeholder involvement. South Africa’s Judicial Service Commission brings in voices from across institutions. In the United States, the president nominates and the Senate confirms judges—an openly political but transparent process. These models show that diversity, inclusivity, and transparency can coexist with autonomy when checks and balances are carefully designed.
India’s judicial appointments system needs reform built on consultation, transparency, and accountability. A new Judicial Council could be established with a majority of judges but also include members from the executive, legislature, and civil society. Such a body would broaden perspectives without diluting judicial primacy. Clear, merit-based criteria for selection should replace arbitrary discretion. Appointments must follow time-bound procedures to prevent delays. Rules limiting post-retirement appointments would help reduce executive influence over serving judges. The Collegium should publish more detailed reasons for its choices, balancing confidentiality with the need for transparency. Finally, performance-linked accountability mechanisms can sustain public trust without undermining judicial independence.
Reform will not come easily. The judiciary is reluctant to share control, fearing erosion of independence. The executive resists giving up influence. Balancing secrecy with transparency is tricky, as candidate evaluations involve sensitive details. Political opportunism can distort reform efforts, while the constitutional constraints of the basic structure doctrine limit how far any model can go. These challenges are real but not insurmountable.
India’s judiciary stands at a crossroads. Recent controversies show that neither unchecked judicial dominance nor political capture is acceptable. A balanced, hybrid model that secures independence while enhancing accountability is essential. Global experiences prove that reform is possible without compromising constitutional principles. India must now summon the will to act. Judiciary, legislature, and civil society must come together to design a transparent, fair, and credible appointment system that strengthens both democracy and judicial integrity.
