India’s Maritime Security: A Crown Jewel of Modi’s Foreign Policy
India’s growing maritime presence has become an increasingly important part of its defence and foreign-policy story under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Warships on sustained deployments, long-range reconnaissance aircraft, intelligence-sharing arrangements and coordinated responses to maritime emergencies are giving India the means to protect international shipping and assist foreign nationals thousands of kilometres from its shores.
The significance of this approach became apparent once again when the Indian Navy rescued 20 Iranian crew members from the pirate-held fishing vessel Azini off Somalia. The operation concluded on November 2, 2026, after more than 48 hours of coordinated activity. According to the Ministry of Defence, a mission-deployed warship and maritime reconnaissance aircraft located and tracked the vessel, while Marine Commandos were reinforced through an airdrop by an Indian Air Force C-17 aircraft. The crew were brought to safety, and Iran’s embassy publicly thanked the Indian government and armed forces. The rescue illustrated how military readiness can create diplomatic goodwill.
From Naval Patrols to Persistent Maritime Presence
One of the defining policy developments of the Modi years was the introduction of Mission Based Deployments in June 2017. The Indian Navy began organising continuous or near-continuous presence in strategically significant areas, including the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, central and southern Indian Ocean, Sunda Strait and approaches to the Malacca Strait. The framework was aligned with Modi’s SAGAR vision, Security and Growth for All in the Region. The model positions ships and aircraft closer to potential emergencies.
That distinction matters in waters through which commercial cargo, oil shipments and thousands of seafarers move every day. It would be misleading to suggest that India had no overseas naval presence before 2014. What the post-2017 framework demonstrates is a more explicitly organised approach to maintaining that presence across multiple maritime areas.
The Operational Record Is More Persuasive Than Slogans
The most useful evidence comes from Operation Sankalp. During a 100-day period ending March 23, 2024, the Indian Navy reported deploying more than 21 ships and 5,000 personnel, spending over 450 ship-days at sea and conducting approximately 900 hours of maritime-surveillance flying. Its forces responded to 18 incidents, helped save more than 110 lives, and provided reassurance to hundreds of merchant vessels. These are figures reported by the Ministry of Defence, covering several maritime threats rather than piracy alone. They show the intensity of India’s security commitments.
The March 2024 rescue of the hijacked merchant vessel MV Ruen provided another powerful demonstration. Operating about 2,600 kilometres from the Indian mainland, Indian naval units used sustained surveillance, warships, Marine Commandos and an Air Force C-17 airdrop. Thirty-five Somali pirates surrendered, and 17 crew members were rescued. The Azini mission, more than two years later, involved a comparable combination of naval presence, aerial monitoring and inter-service coordination. These operations demonstrate a repeatable long-range capability, although not a proven increase in rescue frequency.
Surveillance and Information Sharing Change the Equation
Warships alone do not secure an ocean. Effective maritime operations require knowing where threats are emerging, tracking vessels over vast distances and exchanging reliable information quickly. India’s P-8I maritime patrol aircraft contribute to that capability, alongside shipborne sensors, unmanned aircraft and the broader coastal surveillance network. During the Modi years, the Navy expanded its P-8I fleet through a follow-on order for four aircraft in 2016, supplementing the original eight acquired under an earlier contract. The benefit comes from integrating surveillance with operational response.
Another important development was the establishment of the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region in Gurugram in December 2018. It supports maritime-security information exchange with partner countries and international organisations. In February 2024, the government reported linkages with 25 partner nations and more than 40 international or multinational organisations. It is difficult to attribute any individual rescue to one intelligence system. Nevertheless, sustained monitoring and international coordination are essential components of the broader security architecture.
When Maritime Security Becomes Foreign Policy
The Azini operation carries significance beyond the immediate military result. The sailors were Iranian nationals, the vessel was attacked off Somalia, and Indian forces intervened far from home. Iran’s public expression of gratitude reflected appreciation for an action that served human lives and maritime stability rather than a narrow nationality-based obligation. India’s response to MV Ruen similarly drew appreciation from Bulgaria, whose citizens were among those rescued. Such operations can strengthen diplomatic relationships through action.
This should not be confused with a claim that every rescue proves the success of an entire foreign policy. Regional piracy persists, deployments are expensive, and operational readiness must be maintained under difficult conditions. Yet India’s ability to help protect international sea lanes and foreign crews gives practical meaning to its stated ambition to be a first responder and security partner in the Indian Ocean. The Maritime Anti-Piracy Act, in force since February 2023, has also strengthened the domestic legal framework for dealing with piracy on the high seas.
Credit the Foundations Laid Under Manmohan Singh and A. K. Antony
To recognise the post-2014 expansion without acknowledging what came before would be historically unfair. Under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Defence Minister A. K. Antony, India began continuous anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden in October 2008. By August 2014, official records counted 43 naval deployments, 2,906 merchant vessels escorted, including 2,568 foreign-flagged ships, and 40 piracy attempts thwarted. These achievements established a dependable presence in a vulnerable shipping corridor.
The Navy also conducted demanding rescue operations in that period. In March 2011, Indian naval forces freed 12 Iranian and four Pakistani crew members from a pirate-controlled vessel and detained 16 pirates. The UPA government also pursued coastal radar coverage and inter-agency coordination following the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The original contract for eight P-8I reconnaissance aircraft was signed in 2009, with the first aircraft arriving in 2013. The national coastal intelligence network later inaugurated in November 2014 had been sanctioned in March 2012. Defence capabilities take years to develop, irrespective of inauguration dates.
The Modi government, in turn, expanded elements of that inherited architecture, introduced its wider mission-based deployment model, developed international information-sharing capacity and advanced the anti-piracy legal framework. Recognising those decisions does not require diminishing the UPA’s achievements. Equally, giving credit to the Congress-led government should not obscure policy changes implemented after 2014. A serious assessment must recognise both continuity and change, while reserving the deepest appreciation for the naval and air-force personnel who carry out these dangerous missions.
India’s Foreign Policy Belongs to India
There is a larger lesson here that should rise above political rivalry. Maritime-security policy cannot be reduced to the tenure of a single prime minister. Ships take years to build, aircraft fleets require sustained investment, intelligence systems mature gradually, and relationships with foreign navies develop through repeated cooperation. Manmohan Singh’s government helped establish important foundations; Modi’s government has pursued a broader operational and diplomatic architecture upon them. Both chapters belong to the story of India’s strategic development.
National security deserves a different standard. Governments should be judged on the decisions they make and the results that can be demonstrated. Credit should follow evidence, not party labels. For India, the enduring achievement is an institutionally stronger capacity to act in the national interest and, when circumstances demand, to protect lives beyond national borders.
The Measure of a Maritime Power
The rescue of the Azini crew is worth celebrating because 20 people were saved and because the operation displayed the reach, coordination and professionalism required to make that outcome possible. It is also an opportunity to examine a longer policy trajectory, from the anti-piracy patrols launched in 2008 to today’s more extensive deployment and information-sharing arrangements. India’s maritime ambitions will ultimately be measured not by official praise, but by preparedness, reliable responses, safer shipping and continued cooperation with regional partners.
In that sense, maritime security offers a compelling example of how national policy can improve across changes of government. The Modi-era record deserves close attention for the expansion it documents, just as the UPA-era foundations deserve respect for making later progress possible. The most encouraging feature of this story is not that one party can claim ownership of India’s seas, but that successive governments have treated their security as a responsibility of the Indian state.
