Why India Needs Its Own EMP and HPM Weapons Now
Donald Trump’s recent remarks about the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro sounded bizarre on the surface. A “secret weapon” that made enemy systems simply stop working, rockets that would not launch, buttons that did nothing. Strip away the theatrics and the name-calling, and what remains is something far more serious: an open admission that modern warfare is moving into a phase where battles can be won by disabling electronics rather than destroying armies. This is the context in which electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and high-power microwave (HPM) weapons must be understood, not as science fiction, but as the next logical step in military evolution.
At its core, EMP and HPM warfare is about attacking the nervous system of modern states. Every contemporary military relies on electronics, sensors, communications networks, satellites, computers, and digitally controlled weapons. An EMP or HPM burst does not need to kill soldiers or flatten buildings. It overwhelms circuits, disrupts signals, corrupts data, and renders sophisticated equipment temporarily or permanently useless. In simple terms, it turns advanced forces into blind, deaf, and uncoordinated units within seconds.
The United States has been quietly building this capability for years. Officially, much of the public focus has been on counter-drone systems that use microwaves to disable swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles. These systems are presented as defensive tools, designed to protect bases and ships. However, Trump’s comments about the Maduro operation point to a broader doctrine. EMP and HPM are not standalone weapons; they are force multipliers integrated with cyber operations, electronic warfare, and special forces. The objective is not destruction, but paralysis. When communications collapse and weapons refuse to function, resistance often ends before it begins. Whether or not every detail of Trump’s account is accurate, the message is clear: the US wants adversaries to believe it can switch off their battlefield at will.
China has been even more explicit in showcasing its interest in microwave and directed-energy weapons. Over the past decade, Chinese military exhibitions have repeatedly displayed truck-mounted and fixed HPM systems, particularly marketed as counter-drone and area-denial tools. More importantly, Chinese military writings emphasise “systems destruction warfare”, the idea that victory comes from collapsing the enemy’s operational systems rather than annihilating forces. This context is essential when revisiting the 2020 Galwan clash with India. At the time, Chinese media and unofficial sources hinted at the use of “new technology” that caused intense discomfort and disorientation without visible injuries. India neither confirmed nor denied these claims, but the episode highlighted how future border confrontations may involve non-kinetic coercion designed to avoid escalation while achieving tactical advantage.
Russia’s interest in EMP and HPM is shaped by battlefield economics. The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated how cheap drones and loitering munitions can overwhelm expensive missile-based air defences. Electronic warfare has become a constant contest of adaptation and counter-adaptation. In this environment, microwave weapons are attractive because they offer area effects at a fraction of the cost of traditional interceptors. A single burst can disable multiple targets simultaneously, making them particularly suited for defending critical assets against saturation attacks.
Europe has arrived at similar conclusions. The United Kingdom’s trials of microwave systems such as RapidDestroyer reflect a broader NATO realisation that missile-centric defence is financially unsustainable against mass drone threats. Microwaves offer a pragmatic solution for base defence and infrastructure protection, especially as commercial drone technology becomes widely accessible to both state and non-state actors.
Against this global backdrop, DRDO’s recent unveiling of high-power microwave and related directed-energy systems should be seen as a strategic necessity, not a technological curiosity. India is entering an era where future conflicts, whether on the border or at sea, are likely to begin with electronic disruption rather than artillery barrages. DRDO’s work signals that India understands this shift. Initially, these systems are likely to be deployed in defensive roles, protecting bases, airfields, and high-value assets from drones and electronic attacks. But stopping there would be a mistake.
India cannot afford to treat EMP and HPM purely as shields. Deterrence in the modern era depends on credible offensive capability. If adversaries believe India can only defend, but not retaliate in kind, coercion becomes easier. True deterrence requires the ability to impose comparable costs, to signal that any attempt to electronically paralyse Indian forces will be met with an equivalent response. This does not mean reckless escalation; it means ensuring balance and credibility.
There is also a civilian dimension that cannot be ignored. Modern societies are even more dependent on electronics than militaries. Power grids, telecommunications, railways, airports, banking systems, and emergency services all rely on vulnerable digital infrastructure. EMP and HPM weapons blur the line between military and civilian targets, raising serious questions about resilience and preparedness. For India, this means that weapons development must go hand in hand with infrastructure hardening, redundancy planning, and rapid recovery capabilities.
Looking ahead, India needs a clear doctrine for EMP and HPM warfare. This includes integrating these systems with cyber and electronic warfare units, defining red lines to avoid miscalculation, securing indigenous supply chains for critical electronic components, and establishing clear rules of engagement. Without doctrine, technology risks becoming either unused or dangerously misunderstood.
The era of loud wars may be giving way to silent ones. Battles may begin with systems failing rather than sirens sounding. In such a world, preparedness is not optional. DRDO’s work on EMP and HPM weapons is not about chasing futuristic fantasies; it is about ensuring that India is not caught defenceless in the opening moments of a conflict it did not choose. The wars of the future may not look dramatic, but they will be decided just as decisively.
