Why India Must Reject Russia’s Su-57E and Back Indigenous Jets
As India stares at a widening gap in its fighter fleet, the urgency to induct advanced combat aircraft is undeniable. With squadrons dwindling, ageing platforms retiring, and the indigenous AMCA project still years from operational clearance, offers like the Su-57E from Russia appear to be golden opportunities. Branded as a fifth-generation stealth platform with full technology transfer and Make-in-India manufacturing, the Su-57E is being pitched not just as a fighter, but as a strategic partnership upgrade. However, in the fog of immediate need, lies the danger of a long-term misstep. This article examines why India must resist the lure of the Su-57E, unpacks the practical and structural challenges in such a deal, and offers a grounded five-year action plan rooted in indigenous capability and strategic clarity.
India’s sanctioned fighter squadron strength stands at 42, but the IAF today operates barely 30 active squadrons. With the MiG-21s finally decommissioned and the Jaguars and Mirages nearing obsolescence, the situation is far from ideal. The Tejas Mk1A production line is still ramping up, and the Tejas Mk2 and AMCA are at least half a decade away from active service. It is in this context that Russia’s offer of the Su-57E seems to strike a perfect chord. Moscow has proposed immediate deliveries of 20 to 30 Su-57E aircraft off the shelf, along with the promise of full technology transfer and local production through HAL’s Nashik facility. The aircraft is touted to be highly maneuverable, stealth-capable, compatible with Indian sensors and missiles, and most importantly, free of the political strings that often come with Western platforms. On the surface, it sounds like the answer to India’s problems. But underneath this enticing packaging lies a series of logistical, operational, and strategic complications that India cannot afford to overlook.
The Russian offer rests on four key pillars: stealth capability, maneuverability, full access to the aircraft’s source code, and the promise of Make-in-India production. These features, when viewed in isolation, appear impressive. However, each of them demands scrutiny in light of India’s actual defense production capacity and long-term aerospace objectives. Take the Make-in-India pitch, for instance. Russia proposes that HAL’s Nashik division, which has long been associated with the licensed production of Su-30MKIs, will now be the site of Su-57E manufacturing. But this is more a wish than a plan. HAL Nashik is currently engaged in overhauling and upgrading over 200 Su-30MKI aircraft, many of which are being modernized with new avionics, radars, and weapons integration. Moreover, Nashik is being considered for additional responsibilities related to the Tejas Mk2 program, and possibly even overflow production if the Bengaluru lines get saturated.
Manufacturing a fifth-generation stealth aircraft like the Su-57E is an entirely different industrial challenge. It requires specialized tooling, composite materials handling, radar cross-section management protocols, and testbed environments for new-generation avionics. None of this currently exists at HAL Nashik. To retrofit an ageing facility with stealth-compatible infrastructure would take years, not months. If HAL is forced to split its limited resources between Su-30 upgrades, Tejas responsibilities, and now Su-57E, the result will be a bottleneck that slows down every program simultaneously. It is one thing to sign a deal on paper; it is quite another to assemble, test, validate, and induct complex stealth aircraft with the required precision and timelines.
Beyond manufacturing limitations, the aircraft itself raises red flags. The Su-57 has been in development since the early 2000s, and while Russia claims to have inducted limited numbers, its combat record remains unproven. The few Su-57s deployed in Syria were more for demonstration than for operational relevance. Independent analysts have pointed out that while the aircraft is agile, it falls short of true stealth in its current configuration. Its engine, the AL-41F1, is an interim powerplant, and the more advanced Izdeliye 30 engine is still under development. In terms of sensor fusion, situational awareness, and battlefield networking, the Su-57 trails far behind the F-35 or even upcoming Western designs. For a country like India, which is investing heavily in AI-assisted warfare, drone integration, and net-centric operations, buying into a platform built on older paradigms would be a regression.
Strategically, the decision to induct Su-57E would also tie India further into the Russian supply chain, which has already shown signs of stress following the Ukraine war. There is also the elephant in the room: CAATSA. While India has managed to walk the tightrope so far, adding a high-profile platform like the Su-57E to its arsenal could trigger fresh sanctions, potentially affecting unrelated sectors such as semiconductors, defense electronics, or private aerospace partnerships. Moreover, while Russia promises full source code access, the question remains—how much of that access would translate into actual control for Indian developers? And how many of those customizations would require re-certification, retesting, and joint agreement?
You’re absolutely right. Earlier in our discussion, we compared the Su-57E not just with the F-35A and AMCA, but also with the F-22 Raptor and J-20 Mighty Dragon. Below is the expanded table that includes all five aircraft for a more complete comparison.
| Feature | Su-57E (Russia) | F-35A (USA) | F-22 Raptor (USA) | J-20 (China) | AMCA (India) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stealth Capability | Moderate, partial all-aspect | Excellent frontal stealth | Excellent all-aspect | Good frontal stealth | Designed for full stealth |
| Customization Freedom | High (source code access) | Low (locked systems) | Very low (no access) | Very low | Full (Indian-controlled systems) |
| Manufacturing Rights | Local assembly possible | No | No | No | Full domestic production |
| Operational Timeline | 2026–27 (if off-the-shelf) | Operational | Operational (but retired) | Operational (low rate) | 2030–35 (AMCA Mk1 rollout) |
| Sensor Fusion & AI | Basic to moderate | Very advanced | Advanced | Moderate | AI-native fusion architecture |
| Supercruise Capability | Yes (Mach 1.6+) | Limited (Mach 1.2) | Yes (Mach 1.8) | Limited (depends on WS-15) | Planned (based on engine choice) |
| Maneuverability | Very high (3D thrust vectoring) | Moderate | Very high (2D thrust vectoring) | Moderate | High (TVC planned for Mk2) |
| Industrial Control | Medium (Russia retains oversight) | Very low (US-controlled) | Very low | Very low | Full (sovereign IP control) |
| Political Risk | High (CAATSA, logistics) | High (EUMA, restrictions) | High (no export license) | High (hostile state) | None (built in India) |
A direct comparison of the Su-57E with the American F-35 and India’s own upcoming AMCA highlights where each platform stands—not just in terms of technology, but in long-term value to India’s aerospace ecosystem.
The takeaway is clear. The Su-57E might arrive sooner, but it offers moderate stealth, uncertain performance, and a high dependency on a foreign partner whose global supply lines are under immense pressure. The F-35 offers excellent stealth and sensors but at the cost of autonomy and deep system integration. The AMCA, despite its timeline, is the only path that ensures India is not just flying jets—but building them on its own terms.
Indigenous Is Not Optional: India’s Sovereignty Demands It
Buying the Su-57E may plug a tactical gap, but it would come at a massive strategic cost. Every rupee and engineer hour diverted toward integrating a foreign stealth platform is one taken away from India’s indigenous AMCA and Tejas Mk2 efforts. Once a nation begins building foreign aircraft under license, it often locks itself into dependencies for spares, upgrades, engine swaps, and certification cycles. This is the very trap India escaped when it opted to develop Tejas despite global skepticism. That same lesson must be applied here.
India’s real strategic requirement is not just more aircraft—but the ability to evolve them. Control over source code, manufacturing lines, radar algorithms, and stealth geometry is the foundation for future aerospace dominance. With AMCA on the horizon, supported by advanced programs like CATS Warrior and Ghatak UCAVs, the Indian defense ecosystem is on the verge of a generational leap. To derail that momentum by prioritizing an aircraft like the Su-57, simply because it is marginally faster to procure, would be a grave mistake.
What India needs now is not just a replacement for its MiGs and Mirages—it needs a national roadmap that defends both its skies and its sovereignty. And that begins with a focused, indigenous 5-year action plan.
The Way Forward: 5-Year National Airpower Plan (2026–2031)
India can fill its fighter shortfall, upgrade its existing fleet, and enter the stealth era—without buying the Su-57E or compromising on autonomy. It only needs a coordinated, well-funded, and realistic five-year roadmap.
FY 2026 – Stabilize the Fleet and Lock the Future
The immediate priority must be to arrest the squadron decline and stabilize the production pipeline. Tejas Mk1A deliveries from the existing HAL lines in Bengaluru must hit at least 16–18 units this year. Simultaneously, the government should clear the follow-up order of an additional 40–60 Tejas Mk1As to maintain continuity until Tejas Mk2 enters production. The first 8–10 Su-30MKI aircraft should be inducted into the Super Sukhoi upgrade program, focusing on Uttam AESA radar, new EW suites, and BrahMos-NG compatibility. Meanwhile, the Cabinet must grant final approval for the AMCA project, and initiate infrastructure for the first prototype line. As a stopgap, India can lease up to 18 Mirage-2000-9 jets from the UAE or Gripen-C aircraft from Sweden to fill two temporary squadrons.
FY 2027 – Ramp Production and Begin New Integration
By the second year, Tejas Mk1A production should reach full pace across three lines. The additional order will keep HAL engaged through 2030. At least 10 Su-30MKI aircraft should complete their Super Sukhoi upgrades and begin operational deployment. On the AMCA front, the first prototype should be in advanced ground testing. India must finalize the engine roadmap—whether it be the GE-F414, the French offer, or a Kaveri derivative. On the unmanned side, the CATS Warrior drone should be undergoing full flight testing, and its operational pairing with Tejas should be demonstrated. Ghatak UCAV’s taxi trials should also commence. The leased aircraft should begin rotational retirement as Tejas fills the squadron gap.
FY 2028 – Bridge to Stealth Begins
This year will mark a visible turning point. Tejas Mk1A numbers will surpass 80, with additional Mk1As coming from the follow-up order. A third production line, if built by HAL or a private consortium, can speed this further. At least 30 Su-30MKIs should now be flying in upgraded Super Sukhoi configuration. The first AMCA prototype should conduct its maiden flight. Ghatak UCAV should enter full weapons integration trials. By now, India should field its first operational squadron using a manned-unmanned teaming model—Tejas fighters operating alongside two or more CATS Warrior drones. This structure can act as a pseudo-5th-gen capability even before AMCA enters service.
FY 2029 – Transition into a Modern Force
With AMCA prototypes flying, India can begin low-rate initial production tooling. The Tejas Mk1A second batch should be nearing completion, and Mk2 should begin ground testing. At least 50 Su-30MKIs should be flying in upgraded configuration, giving the IAF a heavy multirole platform capable of competing with 4.5+ generation fighters globally. CATS Warrior squadrons should now be fully integrated into the IAF’s frontline operations, and Ghatak can be inducted into special mission strike roles. Pilot training should now shift to include AI support systems, UCAV battle management, and multi-platform combat data fusion.
FY 2030–31 – Enter the Stealth Era on India’s Terms
By the end of FY 2030, the first few AMCA Mk1s should roll off the line and enter Initial Operational Clearance stage. This marks India’s formal entry into the stealth fighter era—without importing any foreign aircraft or software dependencies. Tejas Mk2 should complete its maiden flight, offering a modern medium-weight replacement for retiring legacy aircraft. Ghatak UCAV should be declared operational, and India should be in a position to export or expand production depending on geopolitical conditions. Over 70 Su-30MKIs should be upgraded by now, and UCAV squadrons should be integrated into at least three major IAF commands.
India’s total fighter strength would rise to 38 or 39 squadrons, including manned-unmanned teams, with full autonomy in production, upgrades, weapons integration, and command protocols. Most importantly, every component of this force—Tejas, Super Sukhoi, UCAVs, and AMCA—is built on Indian design, Indian control, and Indian strategy.
Final Argument: Don’t Trade Sovereignty for Speed
India stands today at a strategic crossroads. The temptation to induct the Su-57E as a quick fix to the IAF’s squadron crisis is understandable, but such decisions must not be made in haste. Fighter aircraft are not just tools of war; they are extensions of national policy, industrial ambition, and technological self-respect. The Su-57E, for all its maneuverability and paper capabilities, represents a path of continued dependency, logistical vulnerability, and technological compromise.
In contrast, India’s own programs—be it the Tejas, the Super Sukhoi upgrade, the Ghatak UCAV, or the AMCA—offer not just solutions, but sovereign capability. They come with delays, yes. But those delays are investments in control. With HAL’s limited capacity already stretched and no stealth infrastructure ready at Nashik, adding Su-57E production to the mix will only slow down every other indigenous effort. It’s not just a question of what aircraft India flies in 2027; it’s about who controls what India flies in 2035.
The Su-57E may arrive earlier, but it will always be someone else’s jet—designed elsewhere, supplied through someone else’s timelines, and embedded with someone else’s decisions. AMCA, when it comes, will be ours in every sense of the word. Sovereignty isn’t just a slogan; it’s a decision. And India must make that decision now—by saying no to the Su-57E, and yes to building the skies on its own terms.
