Expert Analysis of Operation Sindoor and the Rafale Narrative
This analysis is based on a detailed independent military study titled Operation Sindoor: The India–Pakistan Air War (7–10 May 2025), authored by Adrien Fontanellaz and published as an exploratory note by the Centre for Historical and Political-Military Studies. The report reconstructs the conflict using open-source intelligence, satellite imagery, technical assessments, and post-conflict claims from both sides. This op-ed draws directly from that expert assessment and interprets its findings from an Indian strategic perspective.
Operation Sindoor was not designed as a symbolic strike or a public spectacle. According to the report, it was a planned punitive operation aimed at terror infrastructure linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, with escalation control built into every phase. Indian political leadership authorised the military to plan freely, including scenarios involving Pakistani retaliation. This point matters because it establishes that India entered the operation expecting resistance, not assuming a cost-free strike.
The operational results, as assessed in the report, are clear. Indian aircraft penetrated Pakistani airspace, conducted both standoff and close-in precision strikes, and successfully hit multiple high-value targets. In the days that followed, India escalated further by striking Pakistani airbases, command-and-control centres, radars, and drone infrastructure deep inside Pakistan. These strikes degraded Pakistan’s ability to sustain air and drone operations. The conflict ended only after Pakistan requested a ceasefire, which India accepted once its objectives were met. In military terms, this sequence indicates control of escalation and operational superiority.
Pakistan’s response focused heavily on drones, missiles, and attempts to saturate Indian air defences. The report documents multiple waves involving hundreds of drones, rockets, and limited air-delivered munitions. These efforts were intended to expose and neutralise Indian air defence systems, including high-value assets. According to the expert assessment, these attempts largely failed. Indian airbases remained operational, critical air defence systems were not neutralised, and Indian air operations continued throughout the conflict.
Despite this, the post-conflict narrative shifted sharply toward one issue: the possible loss of an Indian Rafale. The report does not confirm a Rafale shoot-down with certainty. Instead, it treats the incident as plausible but unresolved, placing it within a broader discussion of overclaim and information fog. Importantly, the report suggests that if an Indian aircraft was lost, it was likely during a long-range beyond-visual-range engagement after the strike phase, not during the execution of the strike itself.
The expert analysis explains this in simple terms. Pakistan may have used long-range missiles guided by airborne early warning aircraft and ground sensors, allowing fighters to launch without actively emitting radar signals. In such cases, warning time for the targeted aircraft is minimal. The report also notes that India may have underestimated the effective engagement range of these missiles due to assumptions about export-limited variants. This points to a gap in threat assessment, not to any inherent weakness of the Rafale platform or Indian pilots.
A key insight from the report is why the Rafale narrative gained such traction. Rafale is not just another fighter aircraft. It is India’s most visible symbol of air power modernisation and carries political, diplomatic, and reputational weight. The report implicitly shows that Pakistan understood this. Even an ambiguous claim involving Rafale could overshadow extensive damage to Pakistani military infrastructure. From an information warfare perspective, this was a rational choice.
The report also highlights the role of ambiguity. Pakistan’s use of long-range engagements, limited disclosure, and selective claims created a situation where clarity was hard to establish quickly. Chinese-origin networking concepts and cooperative engagement doctrine made such ambiguity technically credible, while China itself remained publicly silent. This combination allowed Pakistan to push a narrow narrative without having to conclusively prove it.
The expert assessment makes it clear that this narrative outcome does not change the military balance of the conflict. India achieved its objectives, absorbed retaliation, escalated decisively, and ended the conflict on its own terms. Pakistan failed to stop the strikes, failed to impose meaningful military costs, and sought a ceasefire after suffering infrastructure damage that will take years to rebuild.
The strategic lesson, as drawn from the report, is uncomfortable but necessary. Modern limited wars are fought simultaneously on the battlefield and in the information space. India demonstrated military superiority during Operation Sindoor, but the Rafale narrative shows how even a single ambiguous incident can distort perception if not addressed rapidly and credibly. Future operations will require tighter integration between military action and information management, especially when facing an adversary that plans for narrative survival rather than battlefield victory.
In conclusion, the expert analysis underlying this op-ed is unambiguous on the core outcome. Operation Sindoor was a military success for India. The Rafale controversy, whether factual or exaggerated, does not alter that assessment. What it does reveal is how perception can be shaped to dilute clear outcomes. Separating expert military analysis from propaganda is essential, and the report provides a solid foundation for doing exactly that.
