Don’t Let Dhaka Outflank Delhi: Nicobar is India’s Best Answer to US-China Tug-of-War
The United States has made its intentions in Bangladesh increasingly clear. From a C-130J Super Hercules landing in Chittagong to exercises like Tiger Lightning-2025 and Pacific Angel, Washington is building presence in a zone that touches both India and Myanmar. Dhaka, under its interim leadership, is seizing the moment. Saint Martin’s Island — a tiny coral outcrop in the Bay of Bengal — is suddenly being floated as a potential bargaining chip, a lever to trade for political or economic concessions from the Americans. For India, this is more than symbolic. It is a wake-up call that unless Delhi acts decisively with the Nicobar Islands, Bangladesh will shape the Bay of Bengal’s strategic narrative to its advantage.
Saint Martin’s Island matters tactically. It overlooks Myanmar’s restive Rakhine State, is proximate to Rohingya refugee concentrations, and sits near India’s sensitive northeastern corridor. The island could easily be positioned as a hub for surveillance, logistics, or even soft basing under the garb of humanitarian or disaster-relief cooperation. For Dhaka, its value is not intrinsic but transactional — a tool to court Washington. The very fact that Bangladesh can contemplate such bargaining highlights a deeper strategic vacuum: India’s failure to put Nicobar at the centre of its Indo-Pacific play.
Contrast this with the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Nicobar is not a bargaining chip, it is a strategic fulcrum. Situated at the gateway to the Malacca Strait — through which nearly 40 percent of Chinese trade and energy flows pass — Nicobar is the only natural outpost that can shape the Indo-Pacific maritime balance. If India were to scale up infrastructure there, from the transshipment port at Great Nicobar to expanded air and naval facilities, it would provide unmatched surveillance and operational reach across the eastern Indian Ocean. Unlike Saint Martin’s, whose significance is regional, Nicobar’s reach is global.
Yet India has hesitated. Environmental clearances, bureaucratic lethargy, and the comfort of “strategic autonomy” have slowed projects that should already have been flagship initiatives. Meanwhile, Dhaka, with a far smaller stake, is playing bold — openly signalling to the US that it can provide alternatives. This perception gap is dangerous. A hesitant India looks less like a decisive power and more like a reluctant participant in its own neighbourhood.
The answer lies in bold repositioning. India must openly integrate Nicobar into the QUAD framework. The US, Japan, and Australia already view it as a natural coordination hub. By expanding tri-service facilities, inviting structured exercises, and offering deeper interoperability, India can convert Nicobar into the Bay of Bengal’s anchor. Doing so would immediately reduce the appeal of Saint Martin’s to Washington and undercut Dhaka’s leverage. More importantly, it would shift Delhi’s image from cautious observer to indispensable actor.
But strategy without economics is hollow. India must not repeat the mistake of separating security from trade. If Delhi is to open Nicobar more fully to QUAD partners, it must demand tariff concessions from Washington as part of the bargain. Indian exporters continue to face steep duties in sectors ranging from textiles to engineering goods. This is the time to connect strategic cooperation to tangible economic outcomes. Washington needs India as a counterbalance to Beijing. India should ensure that need translates into concrete tariff relief and preferential market access.
This also demands an end to India’s outdated neutrality. The rhetoric of “strategic autonomy” served its purpose in the Cold War, but today it limits India’s bargaining power. In a Bay of Bengal where Bangladesh is openly positioning territory as currency, fence-sitting is no longer strategy — it is self-sabotage. India must step out of the comfort zone of half-measures and accept that being a key Indo-Pacific partner requires visible commitments.
The Bay of Bengal is no longer a quiet flank. It is becoming a new front in the US-China competition. Smaller states like Bangladesh are quick to adapt and exploit. India, with far greater resources and far more strategic stakes, cannot afford passivity. By decisively developing Nicobar, linking it to QUAD coordination, and leveraging it for tariff relief, Delhi can reclaim initiative. If it fails, Dhaka’s Saint Martin’s gambit will not just embarrass India — it will outflank it. The choice before Delhi is stark: remain neutral and get sidelined, or act boldly and claim its rightful place at the heart of the Indo-Pacific order.
