Air India Must Stop Flying Boeing 787s
On February 2, 2026, an Air India Boeing 787 Dreamliner operating a London Heathrow to Bengaluru flight was grounded after pilots reported that a fuel control switch moved from “RUN” towards “CUTOFF” during engine start. The aircraft was withdrawn from service, taken into a hangar for detailed inspection, and the incident was formally reported to the regulator. Boeing has joined the technical investigation. This was not a routine snag. Airlines do not ground wide-body aircraft, disrupt schedules, and involve the manufacturer unless the issue is serious. Yet even as this aircraft remains under investigation, Air India continues to operate the rest of its Dreamliner fleet, a decision that raises uncomfortable questions about risk tolerance and public safety.
This incident must be read in the shadow of the AI171 crash, which occurred in June 2025 near Ahmedabad, killing 260 people on board. In that crash, preliminary findings indicated that both engines lost fuel shortly after take-off after the fuel control switches moved from “RUN” to “CUTOFF”, with no definitive explanation established at that stage for why those switches moved. Instead of sustained technical scrutiny, public discourse rapidly drifted towards speculation about pilot intent. That context is unavoidable. When a similar fuel-switch anomaly now appears on another Boeing 787, it fundamentally changes how the earlier crash should be understood and investigated.
Why the fuel switch issue cannot be brushed aside.
A fuel control switch is not a peripheral cockpit component. It directly governs fuel flow to an engine. Any uncommanded or unstable movement is, by definition, a serious failure mode. This is not a transient sensor error or a software alert that can be reset. It is a physical action that can shut down an engine. When such behaviour is reported by pilots and is serious enough to ground an aircraft, it ceases to be a routine maintenance issue and becomes a systemic safety concern.
How Air India’s earlier inspection can be true and still insufficient.
It is important to be precise and fair. When Air India earlier inspected its Boeing 787 fleet and reported “no issues” to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, that statement does not automatically imply negligence or bad faith. Aviation inspections are designed to detect visible, persistent, and reproducible faults. They are checklist-driven and largely static. If a switch feels firm, locks correctly when tested, shows no fault messages, and passes wiring and continuity checks, it will be recorded as serviceable.
The problem is that not all failures behave in a stable or repeatable manner. Some of the most dangerous aviation failures are intermittent. They appear only under specific combinations of vibration, temperature, load, or wear. They can disappear without leaving a trace. Engineers describe these as “no fault found” problems, and regulators acknowledge that they are among the most difficult to identify and certify against.
This is how two truths can coexist. Air India’s inspection can be procedurally correct and honest, and the underlying problem can still exist. A component can pass multiple inspections and still fail under real operating conditions. A switch that behaves perfectly on the ground can misbehave during engine start or flight. Aviation history is full of accidents where post-incident inspections initially found nothing, only for the fault to reappear later under stress.
Why repetition changes everything.
Once the same anomaly is reported again, on the same aircraft type and involving the same safety-critical system, the burden of proof shifts. This is no longer a theoretical risk or a one-off occurrence. It becomes a pattern that demands explanation. At that point, it is not enough for an airline to rely on past inspections or manufacturer assurances. The manufacturer must demonstrate, with evidence, why the system is safe.
Continuing operations under unresolved doubt.
Despite this, Air India continues to operate the Dreamliner fleet. That is a conscious choice. Fleet constraints, commercial pressure, and scheduling disruptions cannot justify flying an aircraft type when unanswered questions persist about a system that directly affects engine operation. Aviation safety is built on margins. When those margins are in doubt, grounding is not panic. It is responsibility. Continuing to fly while hoping the problem does not recur is a calculated risk imposed on passengers without their informed consent.
The danger of outsourcing accountability.
Air India cannot outsource accountability to press statements or carefully worded technical notes. As the operator, it is answerable to passengers and the public. Accepting “no defect found” as a closing answer after a documented anomaly undermines trust in the safety framework. What is required is transparent, independent testing under real operating conditions, not another round of routine checks.
The reckless rush to blame the pilot.
The resurfacing of a credible mechanical issue also casts a harsh light on those who rushed to frame the AI171 crash as an act of pilot suicide. When technical explanations remain plausible and are now being reinforced by fresh incidents, such speculation looks premature and unethical. Assigning intent without proof corrodes safety culture and causes lasting harm to families who deserve facts, not suspicion.
An apology is owed.
Those who publicly promoted suicide theories without evidence owe the pilot’s family a clear and unqualified apology. Investigations exist to establish causes, not to shield institutions by shifting blame onto the dead.
What must happen next.
Air India should suspend Boeing 787 operations until Boeing provides a transparent, independently verified explanation of the fuel switch behaviour and a credible fix. The regulator must order a system-specific audit focused on intermittent failure modes, not generic fleet inspections. Anything less suggests that convenience has been allowed to outrank caution.
Grounding an aircraft is not an admission of failure. Flying one with unresolved safety doubts is.
